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Abstract
We investigate and compare different approaches to derive strategies from observed data
in spatial and spaceless prisoners’ dilemmas experiments. We start with a model where
players choose a fixed action that remains constant for all repetitions of a stage game. As
an extension we then allow players to choose simple repeated game strategies that, how-
ever, remain fixed over the course of the game. We then discuss a method how to identify
changing repeated game strategies. This method is used to study a simple reinforcement
model. We find that in a spatial structure reinforcement plays a more important role than in
a spaceless structure.
JEL-Classification: C72, C92, D74, D83, H41, R12
Keywords: Local interaction, experiments, prisoner’s dilemma, reinforcement, repeated
games.
1 Introduction
We investigate experimentally a prisoners’ dilemma situation in a spatial and a spaceless model.
Theoretically spatial prisoners’ dilemmas have been studied by Axelrod [Axe84], Bonnho-
effer, Nowak and May [BMN93], Ellison [Ell93], Eshel, Samuelson, and Shaked [ESS98],
Kirchkamp [Kir99], Lindgren and Nordahl [LN94], Nowak and May [MN92, MN93], Hegsel-
mann [Heg94], Ely [Ely96] and several others. A brief discussion can be found in [KN00]. In
this literature agents repeatedly use learning rules to choose strategies in repeated symmetric
2   2 games. These strategies can be stage game strategies (see [BMN93, Ell93, ESS98, MN92,
MN93]) or repeated game strategies (see [Axe84, Kir99, LN94, Heg94]). Modelling players’
behaviour as determined by repeated game strategies is a more general, and, in particular in the
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context of prisoners’ dilemmas, a more adequate approach. However, in the experimental lit-
erature the application or analysis of repeated game strategies are sparse. Spaceless structures
have been analysed in [SMU97] or [Axe84]. Experimental studies of spatial situations (see
[KEB97, KEB98, KN00]) restrict their analysis to only stage game strategies. In this article
we attempt to extend the experimental literature in considering also repeated game strategies.
These repeated game strategies will be simple and of the following type: Cooperate if the num-
ber of cooperating neighbours is larger than a certain threshold. The threshold may be different
for each player and may or may not change over time.
We will describe the experimental setup in section 2. We then introduce repeated game
strategies allowing players to condition on past behaviour of their opponents. We start with
a simplified version that assumes constant repeated game strategies for each player in section
3. This simple model explains the experimental data already better than a model with constant
stage game strategies. However, with these constant and simple repeated game strategies we
can not explain all observations. We therefore study a more elaborate model in section 4 where
repeated game strategies may change over time. This allows us to study reasons why repeated
game strategies may change. We relate changes in repeated game strategies to payoffs using a
simple reinforcement approach in section 5. We find that past success of strategies plays a role
to a much larger degree in a spatial structure than in a spaceless one. Section 6 concludes.
2 The experimental setup
In the following we outline our experimental setup. A more detailed discussion is given in
[KN00]. All experiments were conducted at UPF in a computerised laboratory. We compare
two structures, one that we will call ‘circle’, the other we will call ‘group’. Circles model local
interaction, groups model spaceless interaction. The structures are shown in figure 1. In each
period players interact with two neighbours to the left (x1  x2) and two neighbours to the right
(y1  y2). Players knew that they repeatedly interacted for 80 periods with the same neighbours.
In each round each player had two choices: C or D.1 Payoffs were a function of the player’s
own choice as well as the number of neighbours who chose C. The relation is shown in table 1.
Players also obtained information about payoffs and strategies of their neighbours during each
round. In order not to reveal the position of the neighbours this information was ordered by
payoffs in each round. Thus, players only know what their neighbourhood as a whole did, they
could not identify patterns in actions or payoffs of particular players.
3 A model with constant thresholds
Let us first assume that players follow a simple and constant repeated game strategy. Players
cooperate if and only if the number of cooperative neighbours in the last ν periods was greater
1A game theorist might argue that we could have obtained more information had we asked participants only for
one repeated game strategy for each repeated game. This argument presupposes that the submitted repeated game
strategies would also explain the players’ actions if the players could choose stage game strategies on a period
to period basis. However, this is only true for perfectly rational players — and not for real participants of our
experiment. One of the results of this paper is that players in the experiment seem indeed to change their repeated
game strategies while playing a single instance of the repeated game.
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Circle: spatial interaction of players
through overlapping neighbourhoods
Groups: non-spatial interaction, all players
are either in the same neighbourhood, or do
not interact at all.
Figure 1: Neighbourhoods
Payoff:
own number of neighboursgroup members choosing C
action 0 1 2 3 4
C 0 5 10 15 20
D 4 9 14 19 24
Table 1: Payoff Matrix
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than a certain threshold τ  0

1
	
N 
 1  where N is the number of neighbours.2 A player
with τ  0 will always cooperate, a player with τ  1 will cooperate if in the previous period
at least one neighbour played C, . . . , a player with τ  N will only cooperate if all neighbours
cooperated in the previous period, and finally a player with τ  N 
 1 will never cooperate. This
last case may sound strange but it is only a convenient notation: τ  N 
 1 means that in order
to cooperate the player requires more neighbours than there actually are in the neighbourhood
to play C. Since this can never happen, the player never cooperates.
The above strategies presume that cooperative behaviour of each player becomes more likely
with an increasing number of cooperative neighbours.
For each player separately we determine the threshold value τ that maximises the number of
correctly explained actions. If there is no unique such value we take one randomly from the set
of maximising values. We do this separately for time-spans (ν) between 0 and 3. Figure 2 shows
the relation between ν and the relative frequency of unexplained actions. With ν  0 predictions
re
la
tiv
e 
fre
qu
en
cy
 o
f u
ne
xp
la
in
ed
 a
ct
io
ns
number of previous periods taken into account
 Circle  Group
0 1 2 3
.15
.2
.25
All past periods are equally weighted.
Figure 2: Relative frequency of unexplained actions
assume a very simple strategy, players either always play C or they always play D. Actually
the behaviour of most players (84.3%) is best approximated with all D. With such a model we
can not explain 26% of the actions taken in groups, and 19.8% of the actions taken in circles.
The higher rate of Ds in circles makes it easier to approximate players’ behaviour. Introducing
information about a single previous period (ν  1) improves the number of correctly predicted
actions, in particular in groups. The improvement in circles is smaller, which is consistent
with Kirchkamp and Nagel [KN00] who find less strategic interaction in circles than in groups.
Introducing more periods (ν  2 or ν  3) does not improve the number of correctly predicted
actions. Apparently only the previous period has a substantial impact. Introducing more and
irrelevant periods deteriorates the quality of the prediction. We will therefore restrict ourselves
in the following to the case ν  1.
2The reader should note that this approach weights experience from all past ν periods equally. Alternatively
one could use discounting of past experience. Our approach seems, however, sufficient to show that only the recent
past (ν  1) has a substantial impact.
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Figure 3 shows for illustration the distribution of the threshold level τ under the assumption
that τ is constant for each player. In groups we can easily distinguish two types of players: They
constant threshold for each player
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
 Circle  Group
0 1 2 3 4 5
Figure 3: Threshold levels, constant for each player
either never cooperate (τ  5) or require a moderately cooperative neighbourhood (τ  2). 67%
of all players fall into these categories. In circles, however, this distinction is much less clear.
Only 47% of all players are of type τ  5 or τ  2. Many players are better described by some
intermediate strategy.
Figure 4 shows how players’ behaviour over time becomes increasingly consistent with this
simple model. In the first periods of the experiment both in circles and in groups the simple
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Figure 4: The number of false predictions decreases over time
model predicts badly. After about 20 periods, however, predictions become much better.
In appendix A we show the raw data and also how well the raw data can be predicted with
such a simple model. Some of the unpredicted actions may be explained as experiments, but
others (the more persistent ones) may better be explained through a repeated game strategy that
changes over time. We will therefore allow for change of repeated game strategies over time in
the next section.
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4 Changing Repeated Game Strategies
In our experiment we only observe whether a player plays C or D. This behaviour could be
explained with the help of a repeated game strategy, however, when attempting to identify a
repeated game strategy that may change over time we face the problem that a given series of
strategic interactions among agents can be explained by a infinite number of repeated game
strategies of the individual agents.
Similar to the approach taken in section 3 we describe strategies with the help of a threshold
value τ. This reduces that space of repeated game strategies but does not rule out the possibility
that several thresholds τ explain at a given period a player’s behaviour. To further identify τ
we require that τ changes as little as possible. In other words, if there is a τ that explains the
behaviour of a player not only at time t but also at time t  1 or t 
 1 we will favour this τ over
another one that only explains the behaviour at time t.
Here is an example:
Period

t  1 t t 
 1

Action in period t

C D C

number of C’s in the neighbour-
hood in the previous period

3 2 4

possible τ

0  3 3  5 0  4

The example player chooses C in period t  1. In the previous period this player had 3 co-
operative neighbours. It is possible that this player already cooperates with 2, or 1, or even 0
neighbours that play C. However, he obviously does not require 4 or 5, since, as we see, he
already plays C with only 3 neighbours in the previous period. Therefore we can restrict the
range of possible values for τ in period t  1 to 0

3.
In period t this player chooses D. We know that our player had 2 Cs in his neighbourhood
in the previous period. Hence, our player might have played C with 3, or 4, or 5 Cs, but 2 are
apparently not enough. We assume that 1 or 0 are even worse. Thus, we can restrict the range
of possible τs to 3

5.
In period t 
 1 the player chooses C. In the previous period this player had 4 cooperative
neighbours. It is possible that this player already cooperates with 3, or 2, or 1, or even 0
cooperative neighbours. However, he apparently does not require 5. Thus, we can restrict the
range of possible values for τ to 0

4.
In this example only the value τ  3 explains all observations around t. This, however, is a
lucky coincidence. With our data typically three subsequent periods do not allow to reduce the
range for τ to a single value. We have to take into account more periods to determine a unique
value for τ.
More formally we repeatedly apply the following algorithm:
Be n  t  the number of cooperative neighbours of a player in period t  1. Be I0  t  the range
of possible τs that is compatible with a players action in this period:
I0  t 

0

n  t  if the player plays C in period t

n  t 
 1

N 
 1  if the player plays D in period t (1)
Notice that these intervals are never empty.
We distinguish the following conditions:
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a : Ik  t  1  Ik  t  Ik  t 
 1  /0
b : Ik  t  1  Ik  t  /0
c : Ik  t  Ik  t 
 1  /0
d : min  Ik  t  1 fiff max  Ik  t 
e : max  Ik  t  1 ffifl min  Ik  t 
f : min  Ik  t 
 1 fiff max  Ik  t 
g : max  Ik  t 
 1 ffifl min  Ik  t 
We now iteratively reduce the size of the intervals using the following method:
Ik  1 
Ik  t  1  Ik  t   Ik  t 
 1  if a
Ik  t  1  Ik  t  if ! a " b
Ik  t  Ik  t 
 1  if ! a # b  " c
max  Ik  t  if ! a # b # c " d
min  Ik  t  if ! a # b # c # d " e
max  Ik  t  if ! a # b # c # d # e  " f
min  Ik  t  if ! a # b # c # d # e # f  " g
Ik  t  otherwise
(2)
Before we discuss these conditions in more details, we should note two things:
$ Once an interval consists of a singleton it will never change through repeated application
of the above algorithm.
$ Intervals can only become smaller, never larger. Formally % j & kI j  t (' Ik  t  . I.e. we never
add something to a strategy of a player, we only make it more precise. The resulting
strategy will always be compatible with what we have observed.
Condition a is the simplest and most frequent case: The ranges for τ in three subsequent pe-
riods are consistent and allow for one or possibly more values of τ. In this case we take the
intersection of these ranges.
If such an intersection would be empty we try to find only two subsequent periods. We first
look more into the past (b) and then more into the future (c).
If this fails as well, then neighbouring ranges for τ do not intersect at all. In our interpretation
this means that we have detected a change in the conditional strategy of the player. We then
assume some inertia and shrink the interval for τt into the direction of the neighbouring interval.
We do this first for t  1 (conditions d and e) and then for t 
 1 (conditions f and g).
When for all players in the experiment and for all periods Ik  1  Ik then we have reached a
fixed point of the process. We will call these intervals I ) . Notice that with a finite number of
observations the process always reaches a fixed point in a finite number of steps.
Will this process converge to only singletons? It is possible to show that if there is some
randomness in players’ behaviour which is not perfectly correlated with the behaviour of the
neighbours then the probability to obtain a unique τ grows arbitrarily close to 1 when the number
of observations per player (number of periods in our experiment) is only large enough3.
3To see this, one has to show that if Ik * t + is not a singleton then Ik, l * t + will be a singleton if only we find a t -
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Since we have a finite number of observations in our experiment we only obtain a unique τ
for about 90% of all players and periods. To make the analysis simpler we reduce intervals to a
random integer within the interval for the remaining 10%. This is only a technical simplification
that does not affect results.
In appendix A we show for each player the development of the threshold τ over time. Let us
start here with some summary statistics. Figure 5 shows the development of the threshold level
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Figure 5: Threshold level and level of cooperation
τ over time in groups and in circles separately, together with the average level of cooperation.
We see that players both in groups and in circles have a common threshold τ of about 2.5.
This threshold does not depend on the structure. Average cooperation levels are much lower
(between 0.5 and 1.2) and depend on the structure.
Figure 6 shows the increase in τ from period to period depending on the change in the num-
ber of cooperative neighbours from the previous period to the current period. We have only a
very small number of observations for the borderline cases, hence, we should concentrate on the
center of the diagram. We see that in circles players adapt quickly. An increase in the number
of cooperative neighbours is answered with a decrease in the own threshold. A decrease in the
number of cooperative neighbours yields an increase in the own threshold. In groups, however,
the threshold level is not influenced by changes in the number of cooperative neighbours. This
observation can be confirmed by running a robust regression of changes in threshold on changes
in the number of cooperative neighbours. Allowing for correlated observations within sessions
an F-test reveals no significant relation between the two variables for the group case (P ff 0

50),
however a highly significant relation (P fl 0

025) for the circle case.
We interpret this finding as follows:
$ The description of players’ behaviour in groups is satisfactory. Adding another variable
does not improve its explanatory power. Threshold levels seem to be exogenously given.
such that Ik * t +/. Ik * t -0+ is a singleton. In this case l 132 t -54 t 2 , i.e. the above process will converge to a singleton in
at most 2 t -64 t 2 steps. To ascertain the existence of such a t - we need the assumptions of randomness in players’
behaviour together with a large enough number of observations.
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Figure 6: Change of threshold level depending on the change in the number of cooperative
neighbours.
Sizes of the symbols are proportional to the number of observations.
$ The description of players’ behaviour in circles is not complete. Adding another variable
to the model improves its explanatory power. The threshold level changes with a variable
that is endogenous to the model.
In the next section we attempt to explain this endogenous change.
5 A simple reinforcement model
We interpret now the value of the threshold τ as a repeated game strategy. We assume that each
player in each period associates with each possible value of τ a discounted average payoff of
this strategy. Reinforcement (see Erev and Roth [ER98]) suggests that players are more likely
to switch to a strategy that was successful in the past.
Figure 7 shows for each period the average number of different threshold levels players have
experienced up to this period. We see that relatively soon the average player has experience
with four different repeated game strategies. This is less than the maximal number of six in
this case, but allows us to explain his choices with the help of comparisons of payoffs. To do
that we concentrate on the situation when a player switches from one repeated game strategy
(the ‘source’ strategy) to another (the ‘target’ strategy). For each player we calculate for each
period and for each repeated game strategy the discounted4 payoff while using this strategy
up to this period. The difference between the payoff of the ‘target’ strategy and the ‘source’
strategy is shown in figure 8. For both the ‘source’ and the ‘target’ strategy we can use past
payoff experience with this strategy to calculate average payoffs of this strategy. We see that
the average difference is always higher on circles than in groups, i.e. switching from one strategy
to another is more payoff-driven in circles than in groups. We also see that for small thresholds
(τ 7 2 on circles, τ 7 4 in groups) the average difference between ‘target’ and ‘source’ payoffs
4As a discount factor we use 0.9.
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is very small, sometimes even negative. Apparently switching in this range is driven not by past
payoffs but other motives. Speculation for reciprocity might be one of them.
6 Conclusion
We model players’ repeated game strategies with the concept of a threshold value for coopera-
tion. The threshold is defined by the number of cooperating neighbours needed in order for a
player to cooperate.
In a first step we study a model with constant thresholds. Such a model has more degrees of
freedom than a (constant) stage game strategy based model and, hence, can explain more obser-
vations. We find, however, that players’ behaviour can better be explained when the threshold
is allowed to depend on the number of cooperative neighbours or payoffs.
We study a simple reinforcement model and find that strategies that were successful in the
past are indeed more likely to be played. We observe that players change their threshold more
rapidly in a local interaction structure than in a spaceless interaction structure.
As a consequence a decrease of cooperation by neighbours follows an increase of threshold
which leads to less cooperation on the circle than in the groups.
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A Raw Data
Each experiment is represented by two graphs. The top graph for each experiment shows τ
for each period and each player, the bottom graph shows the choice of C or D. To illustrate the
explanatory power of the threshold model we distinguish in the bottom graph between predicted
and unpredicted Cs and Ds. We do this as follows: We find for each player a (constant) threshold
value that explains the highest possible number of Cs and Ds. Those Cs and Ds that can not be
explained with this constant threshold value are ‘unpredicted’, the others are ‘predicted’.
A.1 Experiments on Circles
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A.2 Experiments in Groups
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